Turkey: With ‘Blue Homeland’ Bill, Erdoğan Could Extend Claims in Contested Waters

What happened: A new draft law would grant the Turkish president authority to declare an Exclusive Economic Zone extending up to 200 nautical miles — encroaching on waters also claimed by Greece and Cyprus.

Why it matters: If Turkey passes the bill and stakes its claim, it would revive longstanding tensions over Cyprus’s EEZ, adding new legal and geopolitical uncertainty for East Med energy investors.

What happens next: The bill is expected to reach parliament in the coming days. If it passes, attention will then shift to whether and where Erdoğan chooses to exercise the new authority, with disruption to Cypriot gas projects a distinct possibility.

On 12 May, Ankara University's Maritime Law Research Center released a draft "Turkish Maritime Jurisdiction Areas Law." The bill would grant the president authority to declare an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending up to 200 nautical miles from the Anatolian coast — an area that overlaps with maritime zones claimed by both Greece and Cyprus. Its scope includes fishing, mining, the designation of marine parks and, most crucially, hydrocarbon exploration.

The bill is no mere academic text. The Ministry of National Defense formally endorsed it on 14 May, and submission to the Turkish parliament is expected in the coming days.

The timing is not incidental. The bill has emerged at a moment when East Med energy activity is accelerating on multiple fronts. The past weeks have seen Cyprus authorize the Cronos development plan, and the Glaucus and Pegasus partners have advanced a proposal to commercialize those finds via Egyptian infrastructure.

Moving Cypriot gas to market — particularly lucrative European markets — via Egypt’s Idku and Damietta LNG facilities would allow Cyprus to circumvent Turkey — and its claims in Cypriot waters. The Turkish bill also comes several months after Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis revived debate earlier this year over extending Greece's territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 nautical miles.

Making ‘Blue Homeland’ Law

Against this backdrop, the bill looks less like a spontaneous legal consolidation exercise and more like Ankara signaling that it will not be bypassed in the region's emerging energy architecture.

The legislation intends to formally encode Turkey's “Blue Homeland” doctrine into domestic law. This doctrine, which was first made famous by retired Adm. Cem Gürdeniz in 2006 and developed into a strategic framework by retired Adm. Cihat Yaycı (see Featured Personality) from 2010 onward, defines Turkish maritime sovereignty claims across 462,000 km² of the Aegean, Mediterranean and Black Seas.

The 2019 Turkey-Libya maritime jurisdiction agreement, which is not recognized by Athens or the EU but maintained by Ankara as consistent with international law, drew directly on Yaycı's mapping work and is incorporated into the bill's legal framework, though no accompanying map is provided.

Turkey is not a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and argues that islands should not automatically generate full maritime jurisdictional effect in boundary delimitation, a position that underpins its disputes with both Greece and Cyprus.

European Sanctions Risk

For foreign energy investors, the immediate concern is the interaction between a potential Turkish EEZ declaration and the EU's existing sanctions framework. EU Council Regulation 2019/1890, adopted in November 2019 in response to Turkey's drilling in Cyprus's EEZ, authorizes sanctions against individuals and entities involved in unauthorized hydrocarbon activities in Cypriot waters. To date, its application has been limited to two TPAO executives, but the instrument remains active and was updated in 2023.

Last month, in response to the new Turkish bill, Costas Mavrides, who represents Cyprus in the European Parliament, called for expanding the regulation. Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides, following meetings with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, called for a coordinated European response. He also flagged US interests under the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act in a bid to keep Washington in his corner.

Infrastructure Projects in Jeopardy

Turkey’s decision on whether to move forward with the bill has major implications for East Med infrastructure projects.

The planned submarine cable route of the Great Sea Interconnector — the 898 km project connecting Cyprus and Greece via Crete, backed by €657mn ($765mn) in EU funding — passes through maritime jurisdiction zones defined by the Turkey-Libya agreement. The same applies to the GREGY/Elica Interconnector, a 950 km, 3 GW high-voltage interconnector linking Egypt and Greece, with support from the EU's Global Gateway program.

With a requirement that route survey work for the GSI begin by mid-2026, the Turkish bill appears particularly well-timed to derail that project.

Signposts to Watch

Four variables will determine how much commercial disruption the bill ultimately generates.

1. Whether President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan exercises the new EEZ authority immediately upon enactment or holds back to generate diplomatic leverage.
2. The EU's appetite for expanding the 2019/1890 framework, particularly given American IECs’ deepening presence in Cyprus.
3. Any concrete move by Athens toward a 12-nautical-mile extension in the Aegean. Under a 1995 Turkish parliamentary resolution, this would constitute a casus belli.
4. How Ankara's posture affects the commercial calculus of companies currently in active licensing negotiations with Nicosia.

Given the timing of the announcements, we believe they indicate a concerted desire by the Turkish government to expand its maritime claims, opening a new chapter in the saga of East Med maritime disputes. Erdoğan has invested heavily in relations with Washington since Trump’s return to the White House last year, and Turkish defense production is increasingly critical to Europe as it tries to pivot away from US dependence. This year, Turkey will host a major NATO summit and COP31, lending legitimacy.

These factors give Erdoğan good reason to believe that Western powers will not crack down if he expands Turkey’s East Med maritime claims — even if it disrupts upstream energy projects.