Turkey: SDF’s Collapse Clears Erdogan’s Path to a New Constitution

What happened: The SDF rapidly lost control across northern and eastern Syria after talks with Damascus collapsed; territory, energy assets and political leverage reverted to the central government within days.

Why it matters: The outcome removes a key domestic constraint on Ankara’s Kurdish track, strengthening President Erdogan’s hand to pursue constitutional change and reshaping Turkey’s political risk outlook for investors.

What happens next: We expect Erdogan to push toward a constitutional referendum within twelve months, a path that would likely heighten policy uncertainty and weigh on Turkey’s macroeconomic outlook through fiscal easing.

The rapid collapse of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — the Syrian affiliate of Turkey’s PKK — at the hands of President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s forces remains the hottest topic in Turkey. After functioning as a de facto autonomous entity along Turkey’s southern border for years, the SDF’s territory and political leverage evaporated swiftly after integration talks with Damascus failed.

In our view, the SDF’s defeat is a significant victory for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. By removing the primary irritant in the domestic "Kurdish Initiative," the development will likely accelerate Erdogan’s longstanding push for a new constitution at home, which we believe was the Initiative’s ultimate objective all along.

The SDF’s Controlled Dissolution

Sharaa led government forces to first capture Kurdish-held neighborhoods in Aleppo before launching a broad offensive across the Euphrates. The SDF’s defenses crumbled within days, with Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor falling almost immediately as Arab tribal factions — the bulk of the SDF’s manpower — defected en masse to Damascus.

By 18 January, the SDF had lost roughly 80% of its territory in a week, forcing Commander Mazloum Abdi to negotiate. The resulting agreements dealt a major blow to the Syrian Kurds’ autonomous administration. The SDF surrendered control of oil fields, gas facilities and international border crossings to Damascus, while its personnel were transferred to Damascus’ payroll.

Domestic Angle in Turkey

The SDF had been the central point of friction in the Kurdish Initiative since its inception. Turkish opposition figures — particularly nationalists — argued that unless the SDF dissolved and integrated into the Syrian state, any steps the PKK took were meaningless.

By contrast, the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), a key stakeholder in the initiative, maintained that the SDF was a separate entity from the PKK and resisted calls for the group to relinquish its autonomy, further inflaming nationalist opposition.

The SDF’s degradation resolves this impasse by rendering the DEM Party’s resistance obsolete. This is a major political win for Erdogan, removing the last thorn in his broader agenda.

Next Step: New Constitution

Erdogan’s next move will be drafting a new constitution. Since the 2023 elections, rumors have persisted that the AKP views the current presidential system as a liability, blaming it for economic mismanagement and the party’s growing dependence on coalition allies to secure the required 50%+1 vote.

Although the Kurdish Initiative shifted the focus from the issue, we believe that it was always a vehicle for constitutional change. Ankara’s security elites, foreseeing a shift in Syria in late 2024, identified an opportunity to engage with Syria’s — and Turkey’s — Kurds.

Simultaneously, Erdogan pivoted away from "normalization" with the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) after failing to curb Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu’s influence, instead partnering with the Kurdish movement for his constitutional agenda. This pivot was supported by Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli, who viewed rapprochement with the CHP as a threat to his party’s standing within the governing coalition.

What Kind of a Constitution?

While mainstream analyses focus on Erdogan’s desire to prolong his rule and criticism of the presidential system on efficiency grounds, we argue that these explanations are secondary. In our view, for Erdogan, the primary purpose of a new constitution is to facilitate an eventual transfer of power to his son, Bilal, securing his family’s political position over the long term.

The proposed changes will likely remove the requirement for the president to maintain party affiliation. This would allow Erdogan to hand off his Justice and Development Party (AKP) chairmanship to Bilal, positioning his son for future succession. Formally detaching the presidency from party leadership also shifts the system toward a parliamentary model, potentially addressing widespread public dissatisfaction with the current executive presidency.

Mechanics & Market Implications

To amend the constitution without a referendum, Erdogan needs 400 of 600 parliamentary votes. A referendum requires 360 votes.

Currently, the AKP-MHP bloc, known as the People’s Alliance, holds 330 seats. Combined with the DEM Party’s 58 seats, the Kurdish Initiative backers control 388 votes. Bridging the gap to 400 is plausible; former CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu reportedly commands the loyalty of at least a dozen CHP MPs and may align with the government against the current CHP leadership.

Imposing a new constitution by parliamentary vote could be less disruptive than a referendum, ensuring macroeconomic policy continuity that would be favorable for investors.

A referendum, on the other hand, could inject uncertainty that would cloud Turkey’s macroeconomic outlook. To secure public support, Erdogan would likely increase public spending to win back voters alienated by the cost-of-living crisis. This would increase the expected deficit and raise worries about fiscal management.

On the positive side, however, a campaign environment might also increase the government’s desire to sign high-profile energy deals for public relations value, presenting investment opportunities.

We believe that Erdogan is more likely to pursue a referendum. Enacting a major constitutional overhaul without direct public approval would lack legitimacy and could prove politically problematic in the long term, potentially complicating plans to hand the reins to his son. We therefore expect a referendum in Turkey in the next 12 months.