Mexico: Mexico is Not Venezuela

What happened: President Sheinbaum and former President AMLO responded differently to the US capture of Nicolas Maduro.

Why it matters: Despite rising speculation, we do not foresee US military action in Mexico. We expect US pressure on Mexico to intensify through calibrated channels, particularly security cooperation, corruption enforcement and the USMCA review, rather than through force.

What happens next: Sheinbaum will need to tread carefully in a pivotal year for the bilateral relationship. A key signpost to watch is any credible move against politically exposed figures linked to organized crime, a step that may strengthen ties with Washington.

On 3 December, President Claudia Sheinbaum and her predecessor, former President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), reacted differently to the US capture of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. Sheinbaum joined most regional leaders in rejecting unilateral US action and reaffirming Mexico’s non-intervention doctrine. Her response was measured, institutionally consistent and aimed at containing escalation.

AMLO took a different approach. He reemerged from political retirement to accuse President Donald Trump and the United States of acting as a global tyrant. His intervention revived a confrontational narrative that complicates Sheinbaum’s effort to project a cool head control.

Mexico is Not Venezuela

Speculation has grown in Mexico over whether a similar US unilateral action could target drug traffickers on Mexican soil. After Venezuela, some ask whether Mexico could come next, particularly given fentanyl flows. We view this as unlikely, for three reasons:

1. Security cooperation already delivers results

Mexico has cooperated with the Trump administration on security and counter-narcotics at an unprecedented level. US officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have publicly acknowledged this engagement.

Washington maintains a functional working relationship with President Sheinbaum, even as some voices express concern about actors within her broader coalition. If Washington ever considered direct action, it would differ fundamentally from Venezuela. Any operation would target isolated criminal networks, though such moves would still risk regional violence and destabilization.

2. A strike on Mexico would undermine US interests

A unilateral US action would collapse bilateral cooperation and provoke a nationalist backlash in Mexico, undermining core US strategic and economic interests. MORENA hardliners reacted forcefully to events in Venezuela, and AMLO's rhetoric still resonates with segments of the Mexican left, where sovereignty narratives retain strong mobilizing power rooted in historical US intervention.

3. Venezuela sits at the center of US ideological priorities

For Rubio, Venezuela and Cuba carry deep political and personal significance. Mexico does not. While he openly criticized AMLO, Rubio has adopted a more pragmatic posture toward President Sheinbaum. He has repeatedly emphasized constructive engagement with her team and highlighted the depth of current security cooperation.

Where Pressure Will Come From

Washington will rely on calibrated pressure rather than force. The first channel is legal and political. The US Justice Department indictment of Maduro included allegations against corrupt Mexican officials accused of facilitating Venezuelan cartel operations under diplomatic cover. This creates expectations for action in Mexico.

We believe pressure on Sheinbaum will intensify around high-level corruption. Any credible move against politically exposed figures linked to organized crime, particularly under Security Minister Omar Garcia Harfuch, would send a strong positive signal to Washington, but risk a rupture with AMLO.

The USMCA Angle

Economic leverage represents the most effective tool. Mexico’s integration into US supply chains remains a strategic asset, but it also exposes vulnerabilities. The United States holds significant leverage, yet it must act with precision. Any broad disruption would damage the US economy as much as Mexico’s.

Pressure will therefore concentrate on the upcoming USMCA review. US demands are likely to include stricter controls on Chinese investment and transshipment, adjustments to energy regulations that improve access for US firms, stronger cartel enforcement, tougher migration controls, and increased water deliveries to US border states.

For energy investors, this matters directly. Regulatory discretion, market access and enforcement asymmetries will sit at the center of negotiations.

The Cuba Signal

A quieter but meaningful variable involves Cuba. President Sheinbaum has defended crude shipments on humanitarian and historical grounds, stressing their continuity across administrations.

In practice, Pemex shipments to Cuba have fluctuated for years and declined in 2025. The most recent delivery, estimated at 80,000 barrels, drew scrutiny less for its volume than for its opacity at a time of falling production and ongoing debt restructuring.

In our view, Cuba functions more as a signaling channel than a trigger. A recalibration of shipments or greater transparency could serve as a low-cost gesture toward Washington.